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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The raison d’être of the firm is the ongoing search for, and sustainability of, economic rents 
(Bowman, 1974; Mahoney, 1995). Host governments aim to transfer economic rent from foreign 
investors to domestic factors of production without reducing the inflow of beneficial foreign 
investment (Globerman & Shapiro, 1998). Conflicts between host governments and multinational 
corporations (MNCs) usually centre on the issues of division of rents (Mikdashi, 1976). The 
international oil industry is an industry in which, typically, large economic rents can be earned, 
because the market price is well above the price required to keep the factor of production in active use 
and is above the price required to earn profits. Bargaining and negotiation between host states and oil 
companies determine the division of these rents. Bargaining between the oil companies and host 
governments is positive sum, as the objectives of the two sets of actors are never exclusively 
conflicting. Although the goals of IOCs and governments are very different, there is always a range of 
complementarity or overlap and thus there is scope for each party to achieve its goals through 
cooperation (Eden, Lenway & Schuler, 2005).  
 
During a period of high oil prices, during which time large rents can be earned, the phenomenon of 
resource nationalism comes to the surface, as it is a by-product of high prices (Wälde, 2008). This 
state of affairs corresponds to Wilson’s model of the politics of the world oil market – the petro-
political cycle (PPC) (Wilson, 1986; Wilson, 1987). The PPC model posits that the likelihood and the 
direction of market politicization are a direct function of the boom-and-bust phase of that market; 
thus, petro-politics at the peak of the market will differ substantially from politics in a trough. In 
rising markets, sellers, such as oil-exporting governments, gain leverage; in falling markets, buyers, 
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such as IOCs or oil-importing governments, gain leverage. In addition, in times of rising prices, the 
governments of developing states, which occupy a subordinate position in the international system, 
have real incentive to alter the basic rules of the game and reverse this status quo (Wilson, 1987).1 
 
Historically, there has been cyclical change in the relative balance of power between host states and 
their national oil companies (NOCs) and major international oil companies (IOCs), reflective of the 
cyclical nature of the oil and gas industry (Joffé, Stevens, George, Lux & Searle, 2009; Stevens, 2008; 
Vivoda, 2009). Some periods, such as the 1970s, the early 1980s, and the 2000s, can be classified as 
‘conflicting’. During these periods, rising and relatively high oil prices endowed host states with more 
capital, which helped them to re-negotiate the agreements with the IOCs and to gain larger shares of 
the economic rent. These were also periods characterized by a low degree of compatibility between 
host state and IOC interests. Other periods, such as the late 1980s and 1990s, can be referred to as 
‘cooperative’. During these periods, falling markets and low prices resulted in the balance of power 
shifting to IOCs, which in turn allowed them to gain attractive investment terms in oil-exporting 
countries. Consequently, these periods were characterized by a higher degree of compatibility 
between host state and IOC interests. In short, the larger the rents to be divided, the more intensive the 
bargaining relationship becomes, and vice versa. 
 
Vernon’s obsolescing bargain model (OBM) has occupied central stage in explaining host state–MNC 
bargaining dynamics in the late 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. Such is the importance of this 
explanatory model that some have referred to it as the accepted paradigm of host government-MNC 
relations in the international political economy (Kobrin, 1987; Nebus & Rufin, 2010). The OBM 
explains the changing nature of bargaining relations between an MNC and host country government 
as a function of goals, resources and constraints on both parties (Vernon, 1971). Numerous scholars 
from a wide ideological spectrum have endorsed this argument (Brewer, 1992; Fagre and Wells Jr., 
1982; Kobrin, 1987; Moran, 1974; Vachani, 1995). In the OBM, which is seen as a positive sum game 
in which the goals of the MNC and host state are assumed to be in conflict, the initial bargain favors 
the MNC, but as MNC assets are transformed into hostages, their relative bargaining power shifts to 
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the host state over time. Once bargaining power shifts to the host state, its government imposes more 
conditions on the MNCs, ranging from higher taxes to asset expropriation. Thus, the original bargain 
obsolesces, giving the OBM its name. The OBM was originally applied as an explanation for 
widespread expropriation and nationalization in the 1970s of MNC natural resource subsidiaries 
located in developing countries (Vernon, 1977). Rising oil prices motivated host states to renegotiate 
their agreements with the IOCs, and renegotiation often took the form of outright expropriation. In 
line with the general trends, the 1970s and early 1980s saw oil produced for the international oil 
market progressively brought under state control. The IOCs lost control of numerous ‘sweetheart’ 
deals with oil-exporting governments and their initial bargains obsolesced. 
 
Relations between MNCs and host governments in developing countries changed from the 1970s, 
when they were predominantly confrontational, to being largely cooperative in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Dunning, 1998; Luo, 2001). With greater overall acceptance of FDI in developing countries and 
transitioning economies, and privatization replacing public-sector ownership at a rapid pace around 
the globe, foreign investors in the extractive industries were treated just like FDI in any other sector 
(Moran, 1998). The change in government attitudes was accompanied by economic liberalization, 
deregulation, privatization, less expropriation and the loosening of rules governing FDI – which 
created unprecedented opportunities for MNCs (Ramamurti & Doh, 2004). In the oil industry, the 
openness to FDI that characterized the 1980s and 1990s replaced the nationalistic behavior of the 
1970s. In line with general trends, in the late 1980s and 1990s, the oil industry experienced both 
deregulation and privatization (Stevens, 1998; Grosse, 2005). As a consequence of low oil prices in 
the 1990s, various oil-exporting states offered relatively attractive deals to major IOCs. Reflective of 
the general sentiment of the 1990s, Morse (1999: 14) argued that “resource nationalism has 
disappeared from the discourse of international relations.”  
 
Unsurprisingly, the obsolescing bargaining model was declared to have outlived its usefulness during 
this period (Eden & Lenway, 2001; Eden & Molot, 2002; Levy & Prakash, 2003; Luo, 2001; 
Ramamurti, 2001). As a consequence, various alternatives and improvements to the OBM have 
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emerged in the literature. These include the political bargaining model, which broadens the scope of 
the OBM and makes it iterative, and also includes other stakeholders (for example, NGOs), and 
international commitments (Eden, et al., 2005), and a model developed by Ramamurti (2001). 
Ramamurti’s model conceptualizes host state-MNC relations as part of a two-tier, multi-party 
bargaining process. Tier-1 bargaining between the governments of host and home states occurs 
bilaterally or through multilateral institutions and produces macro rules on FDI that affect micro 
negotiations in Tier-2, in which the traditional bargaining model applies (Ramamurti, 2001). It has 
also been suggested that since MNC-host government relations have become cooperative, little formal 
bargaining occurs between MNCs and host governments (Eden, et al., 2005). 
 
Regardless of whether little formal bargaining has recently occurred between MNCs and host 
governments in most industries, in the international oil industry intense bargaining episodes between 
host states, IOCs, and other stakeholders have been ample. For example, in recent years and driven by 
rising oil prices, many host states have re-negotiated their agreements with IOCs. The investment 
terms for IOCs have worsened in Russia, Venezuela, Chad, and numerous other countries. The major 
IOCs have also been faced with a high degree of industry competition from oil-importing NOCs from 
China and India, in particular. These NOCs have been challenging IOCs worldwide and have 
provided them with fierce competition for oil-production agreements in the Middle East, Latin 
America, the Former Soviet Union and Africa. In recent years the major IOCs have struggled to 
secure access to new oil reserves and, consequently, their oil production has dropped (Vivoda, 2009). 
High oil prices, increased industry competition and the lack of alternative investment options for IOCs 
have translated to unfavorable bargaining outcomes. The oil industry has once again shifted from a 
cooperative phase to a phase characterized by resurgent resource nationalism, increased competition 
and regulation of foreign investment, and expropriations (Joffé, et al., 2009; Stevens, 2008; Vivoda, 
2009).  
 
In the world of international business, negotiation rather than the perfect market equilibrium solution 
is the rule (Agmon, 2003). Nowhere is this more pronounced than in extractive industries, due to 
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cyclical and highly volatile nature of the markets. Since 1986, crude oil, refined petroleum, and 
natural gas prices have been more volatile than prices for about 95% of other producer price index 
commodities (Regnier, 2007). The price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) light crude climbed from 
US$50/barrel in January 2007 to a peak of US$147/barrel in July 2008, subsequently dropping to 
under US$34/barrel in December 2008. Frequently changing market conditions result in changes in 
relative bargaining power between host states and foreign investors, and changes in relative (potential 
or actual) bargaining power lead to (re)bargaining. 
 
Given the cyclical nature of the international oil industry, the OBM only applies to a limited number 
of situations. Yet, the OBM remains a powerful explanatory model in international business literature 
(Gould & Winters, 2007). The OBM and other traditional bargaining models of MNC-host state 
relations assume that MNC entry (or loyalty) conditions depend on the relative bargaining power of 
the two sides, which, in turn, depend on their strengths. The model proposed here builds on these 
traditional models and leverages three key contributions. First, these studies are valuable as they have 
identified multiple variables that are sources of MNC and host state bargaining power. Second, they 
recognize that an actor’s resources and constraints increase and decrease, which in turn affects its 
ability to achieve a favorable bargaining outcome. Third, they acknowledge the dynamic nature of 
bargaining, in that bargaining power shifts over time, as occurs in Vernon’s OBM. Notwithstanding 
their contribution, most of the early models can only account for MNC-host state negotiations on a 
case-by-case basis, in specific market contexts, and in isolation from increasingly complex issues that 
surround the MNC-host state relationship.  
 
The model advanced here recognizes that a bargaining model ought to include other actors and 
stakeholders and hence must be extended beyond the dyadic host state-MNC relationship (Ramamurti, 
2001; Eden, et al., 2005; Henisz & Zelner, 2005). In particular, by utilizing the concept of ‘nesting’, 
the model integrates the effects of firm-specific, industry-specific and host country-specific factors 
and relationships (at both domestic and international level) on the relative bargaining power of host 
governments and IOCs. This paper falls in the tradition of soft rationalism associated with 
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institutional economics. As such, it aims to speak to a wider audience, couching it in formalistic as 
opposed to game theory terms. A descriptive, extensive form of ‘game’ has been adopted given that 
reduced mathematical methodology can be insufficient to an understanding of the entire range of 
variables and actors’ concerns, which include political and social considerations far beyond those 
mathematically measurable. The need for a methodology that allows for more complexity follows 
logically from the increasingly multifarious nature of bargaining between host states and IOCs 
(Hosman, 2009). The model is indispensable in gaining an understanding of how an actor’s power is 
shaped by the complex web of bargains and relationships with actors not directly party to the 
bargaining in which the two parties are enmeshed. As such, the model is useful as a sophisticated 
mechanism with which to grasp the complex array of bargains and relationships within which host 
state-IOC bargaining relationship is nested. Theoretically, the model presented here advances our 
ability to understand bargaining dynamics between host states, oil companies and other stakeholders 
in the oil industry. The corresponding practical contribution is that it will help actors choose strategies 
more systematically, potentially leading to more preferable bargaining outcomes.  
 
The paper is primarily theoretical and in the following section uses contemporary examples from the 
international oil industry to illustrate various factors which may influence the relative bargaining 
power between an IOC and a host state. The model is generalizable to both totalitarian regimes and 
democratic states. A caveat - the dynamic bargaining model developed in this paper is in no particular 
way attributable uniquely to the international oil industry and it can be applied beyond the triad IOC-
host state context.2 In the first instance, it can be utilized to examine the dynamics of the bargaining 
power relationship between host states and national oil companies from non-triad oil-importing 
countries, such as China and India, and between host states and MNCs in the mining industry. 
Additionally, the model may have a more broad-based application, with wider implications for 
contexts other than the extractive industries. 
 
Why is the focus on the international oil industry? Oil remains a key source of primary energy, 
essential for continued smooth operation of the global economy. In 2010, oil accounted for 34% of 
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global energy demand, a level around which it has hovered for several decades (BP, 2011). Crude oil 
and refined products are the largest items in international trade, whether measured by volume or 
value. In 2010, the total value of international crude oil and petroleum product trade amounted to 
US$1.552 trillion, an amount equivalent to Canada’s or India’s annual GDP (BP, 2011). Energy 
transitions are prolonged affairs, and given recent trend, affordability, and vested political and 
economic interests in its continued importance, it is unlikely that the world will shift away from oil 
and other fossil fuels any time soon (Odell, 2004; Maugeri, 2006; Smil, 2010). Historically high oil 
prices have rendered the market power of the oil companies and oil exporting nations particularly 
evident in recent years. The major IOCs (ExxonMobil, BP, Chevron, Royal Dutch/Shell, 
ConocoPhillips, and Total) are some of the world’s largest and most powerful corporations. In 2010, 
the combined profits these oil companies amounted to over US$80 billion and their sales revenues to 
over US$1.6 trillion (Fortune, 2011). Yet such is the scale of the global oil industry that these firms 
control only 6% of global oil reserves with most of the remaining oil reserves controlled by 
governments, largely through their NOCs (Vivoda, 2009).  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the insights from relevant literature that are 
integrated in the model. The literature review has been limited to the articles, books and other items 
that have a direct bearing on the topic being addressed. In Section 3, the paper builds on the existing 
literature on host state-MNC bargaining in order to set up a model for analyzing the dynamics of the 
host state-oil company bargaining relationship. This section then discusses the dynamics of the 
theoretical model. Section 4 summarizes the model’s contribution, its limitations, and outlines 
avenues for further research. 
 
2. RELEVANT LITERATURE 
 
This paper contributes to the development of bargaining power theory in the context of the 
international oil industry. It builds upon previous theory and integrates it into the theoretical model, 
dynamics of which are discussed in Section 3. The literature on bargaining theory reached its high 
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point in the 1970s and 1980s, partly as a consequence of the OBM. This section reviews the relevant 
literature on the factors influencing the relative IOC-host state bargaining power in the domestic and 
international context and is organized as follows. The first subsection reviews the relevant literature 
on the unique relative resources in possession of host states and MNCs. The second and third 
subsections examine the literature on firm-specific resources and constraints in the host state and 
international context. The fourth and fifth subsections analyze the literature on industry-specific 
influences in the host state and international context. The final two subsections examine the 
international institutional resources and constraints for the host state and host country-specific non-
industry factors. 
 
 
2.1. Unique resources: basic entry conditions 
 
In order for an MNC’s bargaining power to generate economic rents that are sustainable, the 
bargaining power must be based on idiosyncratic firm resources and capabilities that are valuable, 
rare, imperfectly imitable, and lack strategically equivalent substitutes (Barney, 1991). The 
possession of firm-specific advantages provides the raison d’être of MNCs (Dunning, 1988). The 
bargaining power of both MNCs and host states comes from the ability to withhold resources and 
capabilities, such as raw materials, capital, and technological and managerial skills that the other party 
wants. These are the basic entry conditions and, in their absence, a mutually beneficial bargaining 
outcome is unattainable. 
 
An MNC’s bargaining power is stronger when the host government wants firm-specific assets that are 
inimitable and are in scarce supply. Financial resources and capital in MNC’s possession increase the 
bargaining power of an MNC vis-à-vis a host government (Bennett & Sharpe, 1985; Fagre & Wells 
Jr., 1982; Lecraw, 1984; Poynter, 1982). Producers need investment capital when their fiscal 
relationship with the state is structured in such a way that their capital needs are sacrificed to 
government budgetary needs or that when their means of revenue generation cannot meet investment 
requirements. During periods characterized by low oil prices, IOCs are often welcomed by host 
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governments that require foreign investment. But during times of higher oil prices, host states seldom 
have severe debt problems and capital difficulties. Thus, they may not require high levels of FDI, and 
consequently possess higher potential bargaining power vis-à-vis IOCs. 
 
Developing countries seek FDI to access the technology and managerial skills of MNCs. The level of 
technology and managerial skills an MNC possesses vis-à-vis the host state has been hypothesized to 
increase the MNC’s bargaining power, ceteris paribus (Bradley, 1977; Fagre & Wells Jr., 1982; 
Lecraw, 1984; Moon & Lado, 2000; Oman, 1984). The main rationale has been that a high level of 
technological and managerial complexity makes the MNC a more difficult target for host 
governments to intervene or expropriate since host governments of developing countries often lack 
the technological competence or knowledge to run MNC’s operations independently. When an 
MNC’s bargaining power is founded on technological ‘know-how’ or managerial expertise, it is likely 
to provide durable basis for generating and appropriating economic rents. MNCs characterized by a 
more sophisticated configuration of technical, operational and managerial systems have greater 
potential bargaining power relative to the host governments (Poynter, 1982).  
 
By contrast, a host state’s power derives from its ability to offer access to rare country-specific 
advantages, such as valuable mineral resources (Levy & Prakash, 2003). Host government’s 
bargaining power is stronger when the host country has valuable natural resources that are desired by 
an MNC (Eden, et al., 2005). In the oil industry, countries that control large reserves possess more 
bargaining power against the IOCs than those in possession of smaller reserves (Vivoda, 2008). 
According to Shelley (2005), those countries which have yet to demonstrate that they have 
commercial reserves and those that have small reserves are likely to obtain a smaller dividend from 
contracts with foreign investors. All else being equal, there will be more interest among the IOCs for 
investing in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, UAE, Venezuela or Russia, rather than Indonesia, 
Malaysia or Egypt. This argument extends to reserve longevity and potential profitability. 
Governments in control of oil reserves, which at current production levels are expected to last longer, 
are expected to have higher bargaining power vis-à-vis the IOCs than those governments whose 
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reserves, at current production rates, are expected to last for a shorter period of time. Countries with 
higher Reserve/Production (R/P) ratios are expected to have more bargaining power against the IOCs 
than countries with lower R/P ratios. Potential oil production profitability also influences the 
bargaining power of IOCs against host countries. There is thus likely to be more interest among the 
IOCs to invest in countries where production would yield high profits, such as in Saudi Arabia or Iraq. 
The higher the potential for profitability, the higher the potential bargaining power the host 
government possesses against the IOCs. 
 
2.2. Firm-specific resources and constraints in the international context 
 
There are various firm-specific factors that may serve as resources or constraints for MNCs when 
bargaining with host states. An MNC’s ability to substitute for host country resources, and in 
extension, high levels of competition among countries for investment, improves its potential 
bargaining power vis-à-vis a host country (Eden & Molot, 2002; Ghosal & Bartlett, 1990; Jenkins, 
1986). By contrast, if an MNC is unable to substitute for host country resources and find alternative 
investment options, this would signal higher potential bargaining power for a particular host state vis-
à-vis that MNC. In the oil industry, if an IOC is engaged in negotiation over entry conditions with a 
host government, and if it has equal or more profitable options to pursue elsewhere, this positively 
affects its potential bargaining power against the host government. 
 
However, previous contracting arrangements by an MNC with other governments may limit its 
options (Eden, et al., 2005). If an IOC recently accepted relatively unfavorable investment conditions 
with a particular host state, it is unlikely that it will achieve more favorable contracting arrangements 
in any forthcoming negotiations with other host states. This argument also extends to the following 
three subsections in the context of a particular host country and the international oil industry context. 
The host state may also be disadvantaged by the existing bargains with other IOCs (Eden & Molot, 
2002). More broadly, the quality of previous bargains may also act as both resources and constraints 
in bargaining for both host states and IOCs. 
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An MNC that has a good international reputation may command greater potential bargaining power 
that may assist in achieving favorable investment terms in its negotiations with the host government 
(Ghosal & Bartlett, 1990). It is unlikely that IOCs with poor environmental records, such as BP in 
light of the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, would be welcome to drill in offshore areas in many other oil-
producing states, particularly without adequate regulation in place. Alternatively, an IOC’s 
membership in international best-practice organizations, such as the Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative (EITI), may increase its international reputation and, in turn, the company may be viewed 
favorably by a host state.  
 
A firm is a political organization that is made up of coalitions competing for power (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1981). Intra-firm conflict over objectives may constrain its ability to fully 
exploit its potential power (Pfeffer, 1982). Moreover, access to markets and the broader global 
distribution network is an MNC power resource (Kobrin, 1987; McKern, 1976; Poynter, 1985; 
Vernon, 1977). The host state’s desire to access global markets and distribution networks, and the 
dependence on the foreign firms who have access to it, produce a constraint on the host government’s 
bargaining power (Tarzi, 1991). In the oil industry, if an IOC can provide an external market for the 
sale of host state’s crude oil or refined products, this becomes a source of potential bargaining power, 
particularly if the host state faces impediments such as sanctions on its oil exports (i.e. in the case of 
Iranian exports to the US). 
 
Major IOCs’ reserve replacement is an important indicator of their bargaining power. In the oil 
industry, reserve replacement is the best guide to whether a company will be able to maintain or grow 
production in the future. It is a key performance measure, and is critical to the manner in which 
financial markets value a company’s stock as it measures a company’s ability to continue to operate 
as a viable entity (Wright & Gallun, 2008). Thus, if an IOC fails to replace its production in any given 
year, this negatively affects their potential bargaining power vis-à-vis host states. Alternatively, if 
they replace all the oil they produce in that year, and manage to secure access to additional reserves, 
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this positively affects their potential relative bargaining power. A healthy reserve replacement ratio 
should always be over 100%. Between 1998 and 2002, the five majors ‘replaced’ 99.7% of oil 
produced, which was at the ‘break-even’ point. However, between 2003 and 2007, the five major 
IOCs replaced only 51.7% of oil they produced (Vivoda, 2009).  
 
An MNC’s country of origin impacts its bargaining power in a host country. This is due to different 
historical, colonial, cultural and political factors. The political climate may be more accepting of 
MNCs from a home country with greater cultural proximity and stronger historical ties (Hofstede 
1980). Such ties may result in a higher perception of value attached to the MNC’s operations by the 
host government, because there may be a closer fit between the company’s management approach and 
what is appropriate locally (Stopford, 1974; Beamish, 1993; Vachani, 1995). MNCs originating from 
politically and economically more powerful countries have more bargaining power than those 
originating from weaker countries (Eden & Molot, 2002; Gilpin, 1975; Tarzi, 1991). While this may 
endow them with some potential bargaining power, whether that potential power is translated into 
actual bargaining power is context dependent. The concept of institutional distance is a useful concept 
for evaluating whether an MNC’s home state affects the company’s bargaining vis-à-vis the host state. 
Kostova & Zaheer (1999) argue that the institutional distance between the home and host country 
affects the IOC’s ability to achieve legitimacy in the host country. Institutional distance refers to 
difference or similarity between the regulatory, cognitive and normative institutions of the two 
countries (Kostova, 1996). When institutional distance is high, governments are likely to see the IOC 
in stereotypical terms, increasing the IOC’s liability of ‘foreignness’ and making it more difficult for 
bargains to be reached (Eden, et al., 2005). In the US case, Vivoda (2010) demonstrated that when the 
US government supports American-based IOCs in bargaining with host states, this support may 
weaken these IOCs due to high institutional distance and/or particularly hostile anti-American 
political and cultural context of the host country.  
 
The overall size of MNCs impacts their potential bargaining power vis-à-vis host governments 
(Bradley, 1977; Fagre & Wells Jr., 1982; Lecraw, 1984; Poynter, 1982 and 1985). Their overall size, 
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as measured by assets is a source of bargaining power for MNCs because larger MNCs would be 
more likely to have the managerial, technological and financial resources to invest in majority-owned 
subsidiaries and also to undertake lengthy negotiations with host governments. It is expected that the 
largest IOCs, such as ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch/Shell, BP, Total and Chevron would have the highest 
potential bargaining power relative to host states. 
 
2.3. Firm-specific resources and constraints in the host country 
 
Sunk costs refer to those investments or expenditures that, once deployed, are very costly to reassign 
to an alternative use (Keesey & Moon, 2000; Marsh, 2007). Long-term contracts for natural resource 
production and distribution facilities and services are the most prominent examples of high sunk cost 
investments in specific assets (Tarzi, 1991; Woodhouse, 2005). Klein, Crawford & Alchian (1978) 
emphasize the problem of “hold- up” in such scenario. A party that has invested in specific assets may 
be forced to accept a worsening of the terms of the relationship after the investment is sunk. Hence, 
asset specificity creates appropriable specialized quasi rents. Once the foreign investor has sunk a 
proportionally large investment into specific assets in the host country, the host government’s relative 
potential bargaining power vis-à-vis the investor increases significantly. Therefore, an IOC’s potential 
bargaining power relative to the host government will depend on how much sunk costs the company 
had deployed in the country. 
 
In addition, firm reputation and legitimacy in the host country can be an important source of an 
MNC’s bargaining power (Moon & Lado, 2000). Economists and business strategy scholars have long 
recognized the importance of ‘invisible assets’, such as corporate reputation, image, and brand name 
(Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Wiegelt & Camerer, 1988; Wilson, 1985). At the time of entry, the 
government treats an MNC as an outsider, or as a firm without legitimate status in the host country. 
Legitimacy can be achieved if the MNC becomes isomorphic with the institutional environment in the 
host country, but this takes time and commitment (Eden, et al., 2005). More broadly, positive 
corporate reputation may enhance an IOC’s potential bargaining power, as positive reputations can 
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convey a signal about an IOC’s ‘socio-political legitimacy’ in dealing with various publics, including 
the host government (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). In turn, the host government may use high-reputation 
IOCs already operating in the host country as a signal to the international investment community that 
it provides an attractive climate for FDI (Weiss, 1990). The argument also extends to host state 
reputation as an FDI destination as perceived by IOCs. 
 
Legitimacy in the host country is likely to be enhanced when the MNC develops partnerships with 
local firms and institutions. It may also be enhanced by good social performance that can make the 
firm become perceived as ‘domestic’ (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994). Local allies can be a potent 
source of bargaining and lobbying power for IOCs vis-à-vis the host government and there often 
exists a strong alliance between MNCs and various powerful host state pro-business groups (Tarzi, 
1991). For example, in a study of the National Energy Policy (NEP) implemented in Canada in 
October 1980, Jenkins (1986) found that American IOCs were able to circumvent the NEP by using 
local allies. Marketing expertise, which encompasses knowledge of marketing and merchandising 
techniques, and possession of differentiated products, also allows the MNC to enjoy market power in 
developing countries (Caves, 1982; Dunning, 1988; Hymer, 1976; Kindleberger, 1969). This 
intangible asset could strengthen local demand for the MNC’s products, and enhance its bargaining 
power relative to host state. 
 
The structure of subsidiary ownership is a source of potential bargaining power, influencing the 
expropriation rate of subsidiaries (Moon & Lado, 2000; Rodriguez, 2008). Joint ventures with local 
governments are likely to safeguard an MNC’s operations from government intervention. Bradley 
(1977) reported that expropriation of joint ventures comprised exclusively of foreign multinationals 
was eight times more likely than expropriation of joint ventures that involved local partners. 
Tomlinson & Brown (1979) have reached similar conclusions. It is expected that IOCs’ which have 
joint ventures with local partners have more potential bargaining power and are less likely to face host 
government intervention. 
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2.4. Industry-specific resources and constraints in the international context 
 
Traditional industrial organization economists have suggested that an industry’s level of profitability 
should decrease as its concentration level (the degree to which a few large sellers dominate an 
industry in terms of relative market share) decreases (Bain, 1951; Bain, 1956; Porter, 1980; Scherer & 
Ross, 1990). In an extension of this argument, intense industry competition, or low industry 
concentration, reduces the bargaining power of an MNC, as firms have to battle more fiercely against 
each other for, inter alia, customer support, best inputs, or the latest technology (Knickerbocker, 
1973; Fagre & Wells Jr., 1982; Kim, 1988; Lecraw, 1984; McKern, 1976; Tarzi, 1991). The result of 
these battles is heightened environmental uncertainty for individual firms (Dess & Beard, 1984). The 
bargaining power of government is greater in highly competitive industries, where more than two or 
three MNCs are able to supply the product or service (Grosse, 1989). Wherever rival sources of 
capital, technology or access to markets have appeared, “their rivalry has diluted the unique strengths 
of any single enterprise and has weakened its bargaining position” (Vernon, 1977: 194). In this 
situation, the government can play firms against each other to obtain the most favorable outcome. 
This argument applies in both the international and host state industry context (the following 
subsection). Similar to the competition provided by the independent oil companies in the 1970s, 
during the last decade the rise of national oil companies has provided host countries with investment 
alternatives (Penrose, 1976; Vernon, 1977; Vivoda, 2009). Chinese, Indian, and Russian NOCs have 
emerged as alternatives to the IOCs in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and the Former Soviet 
Union. The increased competition has given host states increased bargaining power vis-à-vis the 
IOCs. 
 
Moreover, oil prices affect the relative bargaining power between host states and IOCs (Vivoda, 
2009). If oil prices are low, host governments often seek foreign capital investment in their oil 
industries. Therefore, their potential bargaining power against the IOCs is negatively affected. 
Alternatively, if the oil prices are high, host governments often have greater capital flows and may not 
require foreign investment, and thus, their potential bargaining power vis-à-vis the IOCs is positively 
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affected. In these circumstances, host governments rethink their contracts and seek higher taxes and 
royalties. In the 1970s, rising oil prices helped Venezuela to reach better deals with IOCs, and in the 
last decade high oil prices were instrumental in allowing Russia and Venezuela to reach more 
favorable investment conditions (Tugwell, 1975; Vivoda, 2008).  
 
The potential bargaining power of host countries vis-à-vis MNCs is stronger when minerals are 
perceived as scarce, and weaker if they are perceived as abundant (McKern, 1976). Thus, if there is a 
general perception of oil scarcity or peak oil, a view which has gained much popularity in the last 
decade, host states have more potential bargaining power than the IOCs. Alternatively, if there is a 
general perception of abundance of oil, the IOCs have more potential bargaining power vis-à-vis host 
states. The argument extends to the level of concentration of oil reserves. If most of the remaining oil 
reserves are located in a handful of countries, these few countries have more potential bargaining 
power than if reserves were equally divided among all states. Currently, over 60% of remaining oil 
reserves are located in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and if countries in this region were 
to act in concert, their potential bargaining power relative to IOCs would multiply. 
 
If resource nationalism affects one country or region it is likely to spread to other countries and/or 
regions, which is in turn reflected in higher bargaining power for host states. Kobrin (1985) argues 
that diffusion plays an important role in the nationalization of oil. In a direct causal sense, events in 
one country lead to similar events taking place in another, as a result of a process of social 
communication.  Previous unfavorable contracting arrangements by IOCs with host governments limit 
their future options and potential bargaining power vis-à-vis host states and are likely to lead to 
obsolescing bargains elsewhere (Eden, et al., 2005). 
 
Doh and Teegen (2002), and Teegen (2003) show the importance of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) for relations between MNCs and host governments. NGOs often exercise influence by 
framing public discussion and debate on an issue (Nebus & Rufin, 2010). In the international oil 
industry, large international NGOs can play an important role in constraining the actions of IOCs, 
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which are often criticized for their poor environmental performance in one or multiple jurisdictions. If 
this were the case, IOCs’ potential bargaining power relative to host states will be negatively affected. 
 
2.5. Industry-specific resources and constraints in the host country 
 
MNCs operating in industries that are of strategic importance to a host country are expected to be in a 
relatively weak bargaining position. MNCs operating in high importance industries (including cement, 
steel, oil refineries, infrastructure and natural resources) were strongly associated with higher 
intervention levels than MNCs operating in the other industries (Bradley, 1977; Poynter, 1982; 
Poynter, 1985). Where strong nationalist feeling exists, it is particularly likely to be directed at foreign 
oil companies for two key reasons. Oil is a non-renewable resource, so it is easier to argue that oil 
wealth is extracted from the country and not created for it. Oil is also widely regarded as having 
strategic significance (Philip, 1976). 
 
As established in previous subsections, both the level of industry competition in the host country and 
the quality of other IOCs’ bargaining outcomes with the host government affect the relative potential 
bargaining power between a host government and an IOC. In addition, countries with large and 
growing markets enjoy higher bargaining power with MNCs (Gomes-Casseres, 1990). In the 
international oil industry, a host state, such as Russia, with a large and growing domestic market for 
crude oil and refined products, has higher potential bargaining power vis-à-vis IOCs as opposed to a 
host state with a small domestic market, such as Brunei or Bahrain.  
 
Moreover, the host country industry-specific legal context (e.g. investor protection and other 
constraints, such as secrecy in terms of availability of geological maps) affects the relative potential 
bargaining power of IOCs and host governments. If a host government offers no investment 
protection to IOCs which seek to establish a long-term presence in the country, or if there is a history 
of legal battles between the host state and the IOCs over specific terms and conditions of an 
investment contract, the host state’s potential relative bargaining power is negatively affected. This 
 18 
factor is discussed in more detail in the following subsection as the quality of domestic legal context 
is affected by the host state’s international institutional obligations. 
 
2.6. Host state international institutional resources and constraints 
 
A host state’s exercise of power vis-à-vis multinationals is constrained by the international 
environment and international interdependence constrains a host state’s autonomy (Kobrin, 1987; 
Tarzi, 1991). According to Eden (1996), the web of international agreements between nation-states is 
creating an investment regime that offers more protection and bargaining power to multinationals. 
The role of multilateral rules negotiated in international institutions of which host countries are 
members could limit the bargaining power of host states, since most governments are members of 
multilateral organizations (Doh & Ramamurti, 2003; Eden & Molot, 2002; Henisz & Zelner, 2005). 
Ramamurti (2001) argues that government-to-government bargains can establish overall rules of the 
game, which then constrain MNC-host state bargaining in specific issue areas. For example, balance-
of-payments difficulties or severe external debt problems may increase a host country’s demand for 
FDI or limit its freedom of action, due to conditions imposed by international financial organizations 
or commercial banks. Bilateral investment treaties (BITs), multilateral treaties, such as the Energy 
Charter Treaty, and political risk insurance (PRI) through MIGA or OPIC, bestow MNCs with more 
potential bargaining power relative to the host government if the latter is a party to the relevant 
treaties. Since these treaties allow MNCs to recover compensation from host governments for losses 
suffered as a result of expropriation, they constrain the host government’s actions. It is unlikely that 
the host government will engage in direct or indirect expropriation against an MNC’s interests if they 
are aware that international arbitration is to ensue as a consequence (Joffe, et al., 2009). The IOCs 
were helped by the fact that, in the mid-to-late 1990s, Russia and Venezuela suffered economically 
and were highly indebted. Since the Western-dominated institutions were the main creditors of their 
debt, the Western IOCs received indirect support in their bargaining with Russia and Venezuela and 
were able to sign favorable investment agreements (Vivoda, 2008). 
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At the same time, the international institutional environment can also act as a resource for host states. 
For example, OPEC membership may in some situations enhance host state’s bargaining potential 
power relative to an IOC. The development of producer cartels, such as OPEC, created a strong 
impetus for improving expertise within host states to better manage MNCs. Indeed, OPEC was 
formed to share information on terms of concession on pricing formulas, and on strategies that might 
strengthen the hand of negotiators in the host state (Tarzi, 1991). Therefore, cooperation among 
member states may help a particular member in maximizing its interests in bargaining with the IOCs. 
 
2.7. Host country-specific non-industry factors 
 
The level of economic development of a host country can have an impact on MNC’s bargaining 
power relative to the government of that country (Moon & Lado, 2000). A host country’s ‘absorptive 
capacity’, referring to the capacity of its local firms and government agencies “to recognize the value 
of new external information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends,” is directly reflective of its 
level of economic development (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990: 128). Therefore, a host country, which is 
at the high stage of economic development, will be associated with high potential bargaining power. 
Conversely, for countries that are at lower levels of economic development, an MNC would possess 
greater potential bargaining power. In addition, host countries have differing capabilities depending 
on their size. The larger a host state in terms of overall GDP or population, the more likely it is that it 
will have more power at its disposal in bargaining with MNCs. 
 
Multinational corporations do not commit large sums of money in countries with high levels of 
political and economic risk unless they are likely to get extremely generous terms of investment 
(Tarzi, 1991). A host country’s level of political and economic risk and/or stability affects its potential 
bargaining power relative to the MNCs. For example, if a host country’s credit ratings published 
regularly by Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch are favorable, and the credit risk is low, this 
endows the host country with additional potential bargaining power vis-à-vis IOCs, as the perceived 
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investment risks are lower and the jurisdiction is a more attractive investment destination for oil 
companies. 
 
Domestic politics can also impact governments’ negotiations with external parties, including other 
states and MNCs (Gourevitch, 1996; Mayer, 1992; Putnam, 1988). Changes in the domestic political 
and cultural context within a host country affect the relative bargaining power between a host state 
and a multinational corporation (Moon & Lado, 2000; Tarzi, 1991). IOCs’ potential bargaining power 
can evaporate with domestic political changes in host countries. For example, host nations governed 
by populist politicians will almost always tend to obtain greater rewards from intervening in 
subsidiaries, which epitomize the ideological opposite (Poynter, 1985). Attitudes and beliefs of the 
ruling elite and, other groups, such as labor unions, local businesses and NGOs, towards FDI are also 
important in this context (Tarzi, 1991). Dependence of the host country’s economy on FDI may also 
constrain its actions, either because of the control current investors exercise, or the fear of repelling 
future investors (Kobrin, 1987). Additionally, when dealings between the government and IOCs are 
widely publicized in the press and other media, the government tends to have a bargaining advantage, 
since IOCs are often portrayed as foreign interlopers, and the government can utilize public opinion to 
sway negotiations towards more favorable outcomes (Grosse, 1989: 83). Finally, the type of political 
system in the host country may also affect the bargaining relationship between the host government 
and MNCs. Klapp (1987) argues that decentralized, representative democratic governments are more 
vulnerable to the influence of domestic societal groups than centralized and authoritarian 
governments. 
 
3. THE MODEL 
 
This section integrates the extant literature reviewed in the preceding section within a coherent 
theoretical model for analyzing the IOC-host government bargaining dynamics, as illustrated in 
Figure 1, Section 2. Numerous factors influence the relative balance of bargaining power in the oil 
industry and they were identified in the previous section. The model advanced here (Figure 1) is a 
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sophisticated mechanism which integrates a complex array of bargains and relationships. The main 
aim of this section it to elaborate on the dynamics of the model. 
Figure 1  Oil industry dynamic bargaining (OIDB) model. 
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nothing for which to negotiate and without conflict nothing about which to negotiate (Iklé, 1964; 
Jönsson, 2002). Interdependence entails the need for mutual, rather than unilateral, action. Grosse & 
Behrman (1992) argue that it is the dissimilarity of interests or conflicting elements between the two 
parties that are relevant for understanding the bargaining situation. Bargaining determines how the 
dissimilarity of interests is to be settled and the conditions under which cooperation is to take place, if 
at all. The more similar the goals of two parties, the less difficult the bargaining process becomes, and 
the more likely that a cooperative bargaining outcome will be reached. In this context, bargaining 
between an IOC and the host state is characterized as a strategic interaction between two parties 
seeking a mutually acceptable arrangement while each attempts to maximize its own profit. Both 
parties behave rationally and have interests in reaching a cooperative agreement but their interests are 
not identical. 
 
One school of thought in the IBS literature contends that MNCs’ bargaining power is indicated by the 
nature and size of the ‘bargaining outcomes’ that the MNCs achieve through their interactions with 
host governments (Moon & Lado, 2000). The concept of power as an outcome is essentially a 
tautological one that is most closely related with the early work of Robert Dahl (1957). From this 
standpoint, power is the equivalent of successful influence, and power that is not successful is not 
power at all. One evaluates power by examining the outcome or result of some sequence of events or 
interaction. Thus, in the bargaining relationship, power is indexed by the bargaining outcome or the 
nature of the agreement, and, therefore, power can be determined only after the fact. The only way 
one can posit an a priori distribution of power in a bargaining relationship is to assure that the 
relationship reflected in the outcome of previous encounters applies to current bargaining. According 
to this approach, the only empirical manifestation of bargaining power lies in the bargaining outcome, 
and the prime value of power is that it provides retrospective interpretations for the distribution of 
payoff embedded in a settlement. 
An understanding of bargaining outcomes adopted here differs considerably from that adopted by 
Dahl. The understanding of the concept of power is built largely around the work of Bennett & Sharpe 
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(1979). The relative power of actors should not be gauged merely from the bargaining outcome. Such 
post hoc analysis of power excludes any meaningful analysis of why a particular outcome occurred 
and forecloses the possibility that one party had potential power it did not exercise (Bennett & Sharpe, 
1979). Moreover, Bennett & Sharpe (1979: 75) argue that MNCs’ “power resources are not entirely 
interchangeable from context to context, or from contest to contest. What serves as a basis for power 
in one situation may be worthless, perhaps even a liability, in another.” Therefore, one could regard 
supposition that power resources are ‘fungible’, and that the possession of power resources gives one 
a centralized capacity whenever and wherever one pleases, as dangerously misleading (Baldwin, 
1971).3 Consequently, in introducing the international and host country-specific contexts, it is not an 
adequate approach to conceive of IOCs’ bargaining power in terms of the possession of certain 
resources. This myopia arises partly from the strictly dyadic character of the standard pluralist 
conception of power (‘A has power over B’). Such an approach abstracts the actors from all other 
significant relationships in which they are engaged, and thus seeks to locate bargaining power apart 
from these other significant relationships (Bennett & Sharpe, 1979). Instead, what is needed is an 
understanding of how an actor’s power is shaped by the complex web of relationships – with actors 
not directly party to the bargaining in which the two parties are enmeshed.  
 
Since bargaining is contextual, a study of bargaining necessarily raises questions about definition of 
an issue-area and linkages among issues. To exercise influence on one issue often means making 
concessions on another. Keohane & Nye (1977) define a set of issues as an ‘issue area’ when those 
who are working to resolve that set of issues view the issues as closely interdependent and deal with 
them collectively. The politics of the law of the sea differ from the politics of nuclear proliferation; 
the politics of tariffs from the politics of oil. Bargaining also typically encompasses several complex 
issues and nowhere is this more pronounced than in the international oil industry. According to 
Strange (1988: 41) “the international oil business is a particularly complex cat’s-cradle of interlocking 
bargains”. Issue linkage is a useful method for handling complexity. Issue linkage entails combining 
sub-issues that would be non-negotiable if treated separately into package deals and tradeoffs, and it 
allows for an endless variety of contextual factors that influence bargaining behavior and processes 
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(Haas, 1980; Sebenius, 1983; Stein, 1980). The international oil industry is, as an issue area, not in 
isolation from the rest of society. Indeed, it is intimately connected to broader domestic and 
international political and economic issues.  
 
The concept of ‘nesting’, originally developed by Vinod Aggarwal (1985), is of utility in this context, 
as it can assist in contextualizing a given bargaining case within a network of bargains.4 In explaining 
the creation of regimes from the perspective of a hierarchy of systems, Aggarwal uses nesting, a 
systemic level factor. For Aggarwal (1985), the textile system is nested within the overall trading 
system, and the trading system is nested within the overall international strategic system (concerning 
security matters), and actions countries take in other systems influence behavior in the textile 
subsystem. Similar to textile bargaining, bargaining in the international oil industry is not isolated 
from the rest of international and domestic bargaining. Bargaining between actors in the oil industry is 
influenced by, and linked to, the actors’ alliances, and interests and behavior outside the specific issue 
at stake. Similarly, a specific bargaining episode in the international oil industry can influence 
bargaining in other issue areas. 
 
Having established the contextual parameters within which the model operates, the paper now turns to 
outlining how the model works in practice. As illustrated in Figure 1, in the first instance, potential 
power connotes the relative bargaining power of the host government and the IOC, which is 
dependent upon: (1) unique resources of the oil company; and (2) unique resources of the host 
government. These unique resources, which are industry-specific, form the basic entry conditions. In 
their absence from either of the two parties, there will be no basis for an IOC’s entry into, or 
continued presence in, the host country. Unique resources of the oil company are the level of capital 
possession, and technological and managerial expertise relative to the host government. Unique 
resources of the host country include the level of attractiveness of its oil, measured in terms of reserve 
size, reserve longevity, and potential profitability. The relative possession of these resources serves as 
a source of potential relative bargaining power for an IOC and the host state, and the bargaining 
process can begin. 
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There is an abundance of obstacles to the full utilization of potential power, and power resources are 
not automatically translated into effective power over outcomes (Keohane & Nye, 1977). The 
relationship between potential relative bargaining power and actual relative bargaining power is 
moderated by the international and host country context, here referred to as ‘the nest’. There are 
various domestic and international factors which affect whether the potential power of host states and 
IOCs is translated into actual power and these have been discussed in the previous section. The 
rationale for suggesting these factors to be moderators of the relationship between potential and actual 
relative bargaining power is based on literature on issue linkage / nesting, which recognizes that each 
bargain is embedded or nested in a context comprised of a multitude of other bargains. As illustrated 
in Figure 1, IOCs’ relative bargaining power relative to a host government is conditioned by: (1) the 
firm-specific, industry-specific and institutional factors in the international context; and (2) the firm-
specific, industry-specific and host state-specific (non-industry) factors in the host country context. 
These host country and international factors affect the extent to which potential relative bargaining 
power is transformed into actual relative bargaining power. Consequently, the extent of actual relative 
bargaining power is conditional on the ability of the two parties to maximize the resources and 
minimize the constraints presented by other bargains, as well as the overall bargaining context in the 
nest. 
 
If a host government and an IOC have come to an agreement, the terms and conditions of this 
agreement comprise a cooperative bargaining outcome. This successful outcome is measured in terms 
of the MNC’s ownership level and other investment terms and conditions attached in the agreement 
(Fagre & Wells Jr., 1982; Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Lecraw, 1984). An IOC with greater actual 
bargaining power relative to the host state is likely to achieve a preferable bargaining outcome 
characterized by favorable investment terms and conditions. The outcome should favor the party that 
is able to maximize its potential resources and the other parties’ potential constraints in the nest. 
Whether actual relative bargaining power is translated into a favorable bargaining outcome also 
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depends on the relative negotiating skills and capabilities of host government officials and oil 
company negotiators, and the level of uncertainty in negotiations. 
Alternatively, a cooperative bargaining outcome between a host government and an IOC may not be 
reached, and this can take place for a variety of reasons. While this is also a form of bargaining 
outcome, in the model this condition is referred to as exit / no entry. Either or both parties can decide 
to refuse access to its own unique resources during the bargaining process or after a bargaining 
outcome has been reached. In the first case, there is no consensus from the two parties on terms and 
conditions of a mutually beneficial agreement. In other words, their perceived or actual ‘best 
alternatives to negotiated agreement’ (BATNA), win-sets or zones of acceptance are inflexible or 
leave little room for agreement during negotiation (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Putnam, 1988). In the second 
case, a change in conditions in the nest or in the quality of the two parties’ unique resources alters 
perceptions of their respective relative potential and/or actual bargaining power. This, in turn, triggers 
re-bargaining of an earlier agreement. However, the two parties are unable to reach a new cooperative 
bargaining outcome, thus leading to IOC’s exit. 
 
In summary, the initial equilibrium is the moment in which the two parties to potential bargaining 
express interest in each other’s unique resources. During the bargaining process, they are aiming to 
realize a mutuality of interests, employing a positive sum perspective in which bargaining determines 
the division of rewards (economic rents) between the two parties, in which both may benefit. Each 
party would like to reach some agreement rather than disagree and not reach any agreement. Yet, each 
party is seeking a mutually acceptable agreement while attempting to maximize its own profits. Each 
party is making strategic decisions while uncertain about the preferences or behavior of the other. 
There are many possible actors and external influences (as specified in ‘the nest’) that affect the 
relative bargaining power between the two parties and ultimately influence the nature of the mutually 
agreed cooperative outcome (if one is reached in the first place). During the bargaining process, the 
two parties learn about each other’s strengths, weaknesses and strategic preferences, embedded in ‘the 
nest’. After one party has made an offer, the other must decide either to accept it or reject it. 
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Acceptance of the offer ends the bargaining and a cooperative bargaining outcome is reached. After 
rejection, bargaining is either discontinued, or restarted where each party reassesses its preferences in 
light of initial disagreement. 
 
The final task of this section is to briefly explain the dynamism of the model and elucidate the 
conditions under which re-bargaining occurs. The model presented in this paper, which models a 
repeated game in game theory (see Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994) is both dynamic and iterative in two 
important ways. First, when a bargaining outcome is reached, the terms and conditions attached to this 
specific agreement feed back into the nest as they have the potential to affect the quality of future 
bargaining outcomes between IOCs and host states in other bargaining situations. This is similar to 
the way in which the quality of other bargains has affected the bargain in question. For example, if a 
host state and an IOC sign an agreement with conditions that are favorable to the state, this may affect 
other future bargaining outcomes between IOCs and host states. Second, changes in the conditions in 
the nest may affect the basic entry conditions. To illustrate, during a period characterized by low oil 
prices, an IOC may possess unique resources (capital) that host states require. However, if oil prices 
increase to a level seen in mid-2008, they may provide the host state with required capital so that an 
IOC loses the unique resources that the host state needs. A similar scenario may apply if there is 
increased industry competition both internationally and in the context of the host state, thus making a 
particular IOC’s technological and managerial skills replaceable. 
 
When does re-bargaining occur? Whether re-bargaining between the two parties takes place is 
conditioned by changes in the nest and in the possession of unique resources at the two parties’ 
disposal. In other words, non-compliance is conditioned by real or perceived changes in potential and 
actual relative bargaining power between a host state and an IOC. If a host state triggers re-
bargaining, this is usually referred to as intervention, and numerous studies have investigated the 
conditions under which intervention takes place (Bradley, 1977; Combe & Mucchielli, 1998; 
Hawkins, Mintz & Provissiero, 1976; Poynter, 1985; Reuer & Ariño, 2002). An MNC’s competitive 
advantage relative to the host state can be sustained or temporary (Moon & Lado, 2000; Schoemaker, 
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1990). Whether competitive advantage is sustained or temporary depends on changes in the potential 
and actual relative bargaining power as conditioned by the relative possession of unique resources and 
by other bargains in the nest, respectively. The likelihood of host state intervention is higher if the 
IOC has temporary competitive advantage. In such circumstances, IOCs may be highly exposed to the 
host state’s opportunism. By contrast, the host state is likely to be accommodating if the IOC has 
sustained competitive advantage. An IOC may be non-compliant and trigger re-bargaining if it has a 
sustained comparative advantage and perceives that its potential and/or actual bargaining power 
relative to the host state has increased. 
 
4. CONTRIBUTION, LIMITATIONS, AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
This paper has established a model for understanding the dynamics of the host state-IOC bargaining 
relationship. This final section summarizes the model’s contribution, and suggests avenues for further 
empirical research and theory development. Theoretically, the model presented here advances 
scholarly ability to grasp the complexities of bargaining dynamics between host states, IOCs and other 
stakeholders in the oil industry. The model is not simply an extension of the OBM, as it can be 
applied during the entire oil industry cycle. The proposed model builds on and leverages the key 
contributions of the OBM and later bargaining models. In particular, by utilizing the concept of 
‘nesting’, the model extends beyond the host state-IOC dyad and includes the influence of other 
bargains and stakeholders. The paper’s main theoretical contribution is that it extends the bargaining 
power paradigm through the development of a sophisticated and dynamic theoretical model to analyze 
bargaining in the international oil industry. This model integrates key contributions from existing 
scholarship on host state-MNC bargaining while also taking into account the importance of other 
actors and bargains at domestic and international levels that affect bargaining between an IOC and a 
host state. Given the recent changes in the structure of the industry, extreme market volatility, and the 
importance of oil as the largest source of energy for the global economy, this paper is a timely 
addition to the literature on the contemporary oil industry which combines insights from International 
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Business Studies (IBS), International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE) 
literature.  
 
The model is relevant to policy practitioners and executives, particularly those engaged in extractive 
industries. The model is useful as it is a sophisticated mechanism with which policy practitioners and 
executives can grasp the complex array of bargains and relationships within which host state-IOC 
bargaining relationship is nested. The practical contribution is that the model will assist these actors to 
choose strategies more systematically, potentially leading to higher relative bargaining power that 
may translate into preferable bargaining outcomes. Each party can utilize the model as a checklist, 
identifying strengths and weaknesses for both parties associated with each factor in the nest. Once 
these strengths and weaknesses have been identified, each party can then devise a bargaining strategy 
with which it can utilize its strengths and other party’s weaknesses, which endow it with additional 
bargaining power, and which may potentially lead to a better bargaining outcome. The model also 
allows a policy practitioner, company executive or researcher to identify and analyze the underlying 
mechanisms through which actors exert bargaining influence in the international oil industry issue 
area.  
Of course, the model is not without its limitations and some important issues are beyond the scope of 
this paper and require further work. Given that this is a theoretical piece, the relative importance of 
various international and domestic constraints / resources in the nest is not specified in the model. If it 
is to be utilized as a tool to predict likely future bargaining outcomes between IOCs and host states, 
future research needs to be directed towards empirical testing of specific bargaining cases between 
IOCs and host states in the international oil industry in order to ascertain the relative importance of 
specific domestic and international constraints and resources located in the nest. Recent examples 
which may be used as empirical cases include bargaining relationship between various Western IOCs 
and the governments of Venezuela, Russia or Iran; bargaining relationship between BP and the US 
government during and in the aftermath of the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill; or following Levy & 
Kolk (2002), bargaining between IOCs and governments over climate change policy. A significant 
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amount of data on these and other, bargaining cases will need to be collected and analyzed so that the 
researcher may accurately measure the relative importance of variables in the nest in affecting the 
relative bargaining power of the two parties. Future research will also need to be directed at analyzing 
the degree to which changes in the nest and in basic entry conditions affect relative bargaining power 
and the quality of bargaining outcomes respectively. 
 
The model treats the relative bargaining power of the two parties and their respective bargaining 
outcome preferences and bargaining outcomes as separate constructs, following previous approaches 
in the literature (Nebus & Rufin, 2010). Analysis of mediator variables – the outcome preferences, the 
perfect access to information about resources/constraints, the timing, relative bargaining skills, and 
level of salience attached to the bargaining case by two respective parties – is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Future research will need to be directed towards analyses of the effect of these and other 
mediator variables on influencing whether relative actual bargaining power is translated into 
preferable bargaining outcomes for the two parties. A final avenue for further research is to analyze 
what specific changes in the basic entry conditions and in the nest trigger re-bargaining by the two 
parties. 
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NOTES 
                                                          
1 It is also plausible that there is a reverse causality and that the oil prices are affected by the changing balance of power in 
the oil industry. For instance, oil prices are likely to rise when oil-exporting countries have more power relative to the IOCs 
and oil importing countries, and are likely to drop when the oil-exporters have less relative power. 
2 Triad economies include OECD North America, Europe and Asia. 
3 The phrase is from Parsons (1963), whose suggestion that power be seen on the analogy of money leads to the erroneous 
supposition of the fungibility of power. For a corrective, see Baldwin (1971). 
4 George Tsebelis (1990) applied ‘nesting’ to game theory. 
